Consequences for wind technology diffusion under different configurations of tradable green certificate systems by Dinica, Valentina
CONSEQUENCES FOR WIND TECHNOLOGY DIFFUSION UNDER DIFFERENT 
CONFIGURATIONS OF TRADABLE GREEN CERTIFICATE SYSTEMS 
 
 
Valentina Dinica 
Center for Clean Technology and Environmental Policy, University of Twente,  
P.O. Box  217, 7500 AE, Enschede, The Netherlands 
E-mail: V.Dinica@cstm.utwente.nl, Tel: +31 53 489 4171, Fax: +31 53 489 4850 
 
 
ABSTRACT   
The liberalisation of Western European electricity sectors challenged governments to revise the support systems for the 
reduction of market barriers of renewable technologies. One of the most frequently discussed support approaches is the 
imposition of legal quota obligations for the generation, trade or consumption of renewable electricity that can be 
implemented through tradable green certificates. But there are substantial uncertainties regarding the impacts this new 
support approach could have on the diffusion of renewable technologies. The aim of this paper is to suggest an analytical 
framework that could help underpin possible consequences for market diffusion of wind technology under different 
configurations of green certificates trade and obligation. The underlying idea is that any support system can be described in 
terms of aggregated economic risks and likely ranges of projects' profitability. These two characteristics strongly influence 
the diffusion patterns of the supported technology(-ies), which in turn are reflected in effectiveness of support systems and 
the prospects for continuity of market diffusion processes in the long-term. The main conclusion of the paper is that tradable 
green certificate systems can have very wide impacts on technology diffusion, depending on how the obligation is designed. 
Some systems encourage substantial new investments while others can threaten the continuity of market diffusion processes.   
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION  
In Western Europe governments aim to increase the 
market share of renewable electricity. This goal has to be 
achieved against the background of increased 
competition in electricity trade. The imposition of quota 
obligations implementable through tradable green 
certificates (TGC) appears a promising option to reach 
this goal without inhibiting the new market structures. 
This support approach detaches the physical stream of 
electricity from its “greenness”, which can be sold 
separately in markets for green certificates. Several 
countries have already designed quota obligations and 
TGC systems. Others are still hesitating on whether this 
support approach is suitable for their renewables’ target 
or how best to design it. There is uncertainty on what 
consequences different TGC configurations would have 
on diffusion patterns and processes of renewable 
technologies. Some countries, where wind technology 
manufacturing has become an important industrial sector, 
are particularly interested on how would a TGC system 
affect their industry. Wind technology has recorded 
substantial technical progress and costs reductions in the 
last decade and there is uncertainty on whether a TGC 
system will slow down or threaten the diffusion and 
development course reached so far. The same concern is 
shared by the many companies that invested considerable 
financial and human resources in bringing wind 
technology to its current performances. 
Elsewhere, the author developed an analytical framework 
aiming to understand and compare the market diffusion 
potential of various types of support systems targeted at 
any specific type of renewable electricity technology [1]. 
This paper is an application of that more general 
analytical framework, for the case when support systems 
take forms in the larger category of quota obligations 
based on TGC, and when the dependent variable is the 
fate of wind technology diffusion1. Using to a large 
extent the main findings in this previous research, the 
paper proposes some answers for the following questions 
currently facing both governments and wind industry 
companies. How can very different TGC configurations 
be more easily analysed and compared? How can they 
influence diffusion patterns and processes of wind 
technology? Is any legal quota TGC system effective in 
target achievement and able to create an investment 
framework that supports the continuity of market 
diffusion processes? To simplify theoretical inquiry, the 
entire analysis is performed from the perspectives of 
(potential) plant owners that are not under quota 
obligation and financing agents. Section 2 unfolds the 
methodology used in the attempt to answer these 
questions. Further Section 3 presents in more detail how 
TGC configurations can be more easily compared, how 
can they be related to diffusion patterns, and how these in 
their turn could relate to diffusion results and prospects 
for diffusion continuity. Section 4 draws the conclusions 
of the paper.   
 
 
2. METHODOLOGY 
The theoretical inquiry is based on the following steps. 
Firstly, the main variables in the design of legal quota 
obligations based on tradable green certificates are 
reviewed in terms of the forms they could take. They 
represent the independent variables of the analytical 
framework. Secondly, four possible configurations of 
TGC systems are selected, by choosing certain forms for 
the selected variables. Thirdly, the TGC configurations 
are analysed in terms of economic risks - considered as 
aggregations of demand risks and price risks. Further, 
inferences / assumptions are made regarding the possible 
ranges of profitability for projects. The selection of the 
four configurations is done so as to result in very 
different risk-profitability combinations. This is done to 
support the point that quota obligations and trade design 
can have very wide consequences for technology 
diffusion, and they don't represent just one type of 
support mechanism with one stream - yet unknown - of 
consequences. In general, risk-profitability investment 
frameworks are directly shaped by the characteristics of 
support systems, and we consider that they influence the 
market diffusion patterns of the targeted technology. In 
their turn, the diffusion patterns of technologies influence 
diffusion results at a certain moment in time and the 
prospects for continuity of market diffusion processes. 
We propose to focus on four indicators of diffusion 
patterns: types of project developers, types of financing 
schemes used, projects' sizes, and the degree of 
innovativeness of technological designs adopted in the 
market. They represent the intermediary variables of our 
analytical framework. Consequently, in the fourth step, 
some probabilistic correlations are formulated regarding 
the forms the four indicators for diffusion patterns could 
take under the different risk-profitability contexts 
emerging from the four TGC configurations under 
consideration. This step draws substantially on previous 
research [1], combining theoretical literature on financing 
and corporate behaviour with empirical observations of 
the researcher. Fifthly, expectations are formulated with 
regard to the effectiveness of the analysed TGC 
configurations and the prospects for long term continuity 
of market diffusion processes. These are the dependent 
variables of the research model and will be discussed in 
terms of capacity increase potential, likelihood of 
improvements in cost-technical performances, industrial 
dynamics and social acceptance of wind technology. 
The analysis relies on the following assumptions:  
1) only new capacity is eligible to participate for TGC;  
2) there are no barriers obstructing diffusion such as 
institutional, social, environmental, administrative; 
3) there are no constraints on the forms that the four 
indicators for diffusion patterns could take, such as 
legally or socially-administratively derived limits on 
project sizes, restrictions on technological choice, or 
administrative preference to approve projects only 
for certain types of developers; 
4) imported green electricity or green certificates are 
not eligible to participate in the TGC system;  
5) renewable electricity consumed by (self-)generators 
can receive tradable green certificates 
6) obligees are competitors in the general electricity 
market. 
The next section elaborates the analytical framework. 
 
 
3. THE ANALYSIS OF CONFIGURATIONS OF 
TRADABLE GREEN CERTIFICATE SYSTEMS  
3.1Key variables in TGC-based quota obligations 
The main variables in the design of TGC-based quota 
obligations on which we focus in the framework of this  
 
 
 
paper, are presented in Table 1. They are the design 
elements most frequently discussed in policy making 
spheres and consultation processes, and they are also the 
most often referred to in the recent research literature on 
the subject [2,3]. 
 
  Variables in the design of TGC systems Possible forms of variables 
The obligee Generators / Grid companies / Suppliers / Consumers 
Cost discharge Unlimited levy fund on all consumers /  
Limited levy fund on all consumers / Own customers 
Right of obligee to own wind plants Yes / No 
Price ceiling Yes / No 
Price floor Yes / No 
Penalty for non-compliance Financial / Licence suspension 
Recycling of financial penalty To compliant obligees / To wind generators 
Life-time of certificates 1 year / Few years / Unlimited 
Frequency of compliance proof Annual / Every few years / Long 
Banking Yes / No 
Borrowing Yes / No 
Split of obligation in technology bands Yes / No 
Time horizon obligation Long / Shorter than investment recovery 
 Table 1. Main variables in the design of tradable green certificate systems and possible forms they can take. 
 
3.2 Analysis of four possible TGC configurations  
In Table 2 we proposed four configurations of quota 
obligation design and TGC systems. Variables were 
given forms so as to result in four very different 
(economic) risk–profitability circumstances for investors. 
During the 1990s most of the Western European 
countries supported renewables by offering various forms 
of guarantees on demand and special price mechanisms. 
In principle support systems could be described in terms 
of types of demand, contractual parameters, price design 
in the electricity law, and policy instruments meant to 
improve projects’ profitability when legal price support 
was not sufficient, such as soft-loans, fiscal advantages or 
investment subsidies. The number of variables that 
potential developers and financing agents had to take into 
account to derive the demand risks, price risks and the 
likely ranges of projects’ profitability were generally 
manageable. But with the introduction of the TGC-based  
approach for renewables support this has become very 
difficult. Investors do not have yet experience in 
interpreting these new variables and their likely  
 
interaction. We propose a way of aggregating some of 
these new variables, selected in Table 1, and reflecting 
them back in the older more familiar frame defined by 
demand risks and price risks, on the one hand, and likely 
ranges of project’s profitability, on the other hand.  
Demand risks could be assessed by looking mainly at the 
forms of the following variables:  
- who are the obligees, and if they have the right to 
own renewable plants (variables 1 and 3 in Table 2);  
- which cost-discharge mechanism applies and what is 
the penalty for non-compliance (2, 6 in Table 2); 
- whether banking and borrowing is allowed and to 
what extent (10, 11 in Table 2); 
- the time horizon of the obligation (13 in Table 2).  
Price risks could be analysed looking at:  
- the cost discharge mechanism; and the presence of 
price floors and ceilings (2, 4, 5 in Table 2);  
- the life-time of certificates and the frequency of 
compliance proof (variables 8, 9 in Table 2);  
- the recycling of financial penalties, and obligation 
split in technological bands (7, 12 in Table 20). 
Regarding the likely profitability of projects the analysis 
of the following variables would be necessary:  
- the cost discharge mechanism; presence and levels  
of price floors and ceilings (2, 4, 5 in Table 2);  
- the life-time of certificates and the frequency of 
compliance proof (8, 9 in Table 2).  
 
Variables in the design of  
TGC systems 
Configuration 1 Configuration 2 Configuration 3 Configuration 4 
1. The obligee Distribution firms Suppliers Suppliers Suppliers 
2. Cost discharge Limited levy fund 
on all consumers 
Limited levy fund 
on all consumers 
Limited levy fund 
on all consumers 
Own customers 
3. Right of obligee to own 
generation plants 
No Yes No No 
4. Price ceiling Yes and High Yes and High Yes but Low Yes but Low 
5. Price floor Yes and High Yes and High   Yes but Low No 
6. Penalty for non-compliance Pay ceilings from 
own financial 
resources 
Pay price ceiling 
from levy fund  
Pay half-ceiling 
fines from own 
resources 
Pay ceilings from 
own financial 
resources 
7. Recycling of financial penalty To generators 
with unsold TGC 
Among compliant 
obligees 
To generators 
with unsold TGC 
Among compliant 
obligees 
8. Life-time of certificates 1 year 3 years 6 years 1 year 
9. Frequency of compliance proof 1 year 5 years 3 years 5 years 
10. Banking No Yes Yes Yes 
11. Borrowing No No No No 
12. Split of obligation in more 
technology bands 
Yes No Yes No 
13. Time horizon obligation Large – 30 years Short – 10 years Large – 30 years Short – 10 years 
Table 2. Examples of configurations of TGC-based quota obligations for renewables’ support. 
 
Configuration 1 is a case of low economic risks and quite 
good prospects of profitability levels of projects. The 
forms of its variables create a framework of demand risks 
that can be assessed as low because of several reasons. 
Firstly, the obligees - distribution companies - cannot 
own generation plants. As they can only be buyers of 
green electricity or certificates, potential investors are 
spared of the uncertainties related to the investment 
strategies versus purchase strategies of obligees to 
respond to their quota requirements. Secondly, when 
distributors comply with their obligations they can 
discharge the TGC costs on a general levy fund, while if 
they do not comply they have to pay the price ceiling for 
each kWh missing from their quota, from the company’s 
own financial resources. This combination is able to 
boost confidence in demand. Thirdly, when no borrowing 
or banking is allowed, investors are spared of the 
uncertainties related to poor transparency regarding the 
compliance strategies of obligees. Fourthly, the long time 
horizon increases of obligation increases confidence in 
investment costs recovery, even when investments are 
done at a later time after obligation start, in order to have 
a better understanding of how the market works. 
Further, price risks can also be assessed as low in 
Configuration 1 based on the following signals. Firstly, 
price ceiling and floors exist, which enables investors 
derive some expectations regarding cash flows of 
projects. Secondly, price risks are low because the fines 
from non-compliant obligees are distributed among 
(wind) generators with unsold certificates. When the 
quota obligation is split among technology bands, both 
demand and price risks are reduced, eliminating 
competition with maybe normally more expensive but 
possibly generously subsidised alternative technologies. 
All these variables together indicate low aggregated 
economic risks for investments. The fact the projects’ 
profitability is likely to be good can be estimated, firstly, 
from the high levels of price floors and ceiling. Besides, 
the fact the obligees can discharge costs on an all-
consumers levy fund leads to the assumption that, under 
pressure to comply, there might be a willingness to 
accept price proposals close to the legal ceiling. 
Secondly, in principle, when the life-time of certificates 
is longer than the time interval when obligees have to 
prove compliance, generators could afford to keep TGC 
prices high before deadline. This can be taken as an 
indicator that good profitability on projects is possible. 
Configuration 2 is a case of high economic risks but 
possibly good levels of projects’ profitability, for non-
obligee investors. Demand risks for potential investors 
that are not quota obligees can be assessed as high, 
because the obligees - suppliers - have the right too own 
renewable plants. Their buying versus investment 
preferences create uncertainties on remaining demand 
size, which are increased by the fact that obligees may 
bank their self-produced TGC. It is not realistic to 
consider that borrowing of TGC among obligees would 
work since under this configuration, financial penalties 
are recycled to compliant - and competitor - suppliers. In 
addition, demand risks are high because an obligation 
time horizon of only 10 years would enable the recovery 
- with more certainty - of investment costs only when 
investments are done in the first years of the obligation. 
Price risks are high for non-obligee investors because the 
recycling of financial penalties - in this case the 
remaining levy fund - is done for the compliant obligees. 
This way independent generators run the risk of 
remaining with zero income on the unsold TGC. 
Secondly, price risks are also high, because the life-time 
of certificates (3 years) is lower than the frequency of 
compliance proof (5 years). This creates opportunities for 
TGC purchasing obligees to keep prices close to the floor 
level, facing generators with high price risks. However, 
the range of projects’ profitability is likely to be still 
good because price floor levels are set at sufficiently high 
levels to make investments economically attractive. The 
fact that the quota obligation is not split in technological 
bands increases both demand and price risks. 
Configuration 3 is a case of low economic risks but 
possibly low levels of profitability for projects. The 
reasons why demand risks could be viewed as low are to 
a large extent similar to those discussed for the demand 
risks under Configuration 1. Banking was considered 
possible under this new case, which in principle poses 
some uncertainties on remaining demand size for an 
ongoing obligation period. But given that all the other 
demand-influencing variables have favourable forms, 
overall demand risks remain low this time. Price risks are 
also low because price floors and ceilings are present. In 
addition, because the life-time of certificates is longer 
than one compliance interval, generators who are not 
satisfied to get half-ceiling prices for their unsold TGC 
have the possibility to keep them for trade in the next 
compliance period. The levels of profitability are likely to 
be low, because both price floor and ceiling are low, and 
the financial penalty amounts to only half of the ceiling. 
Configuration 4 is a case of high economic risks and 
again low levels of profitability. Demand risks are in 
some respects moderate, even low, because obligees may 
not own renewable plants, TGC related costs are 
discharged on supplier’s own customers, and when 
suppliers fail to meet their obligation they have to pay 
ceiling price per each kWh short. Penalty funds are 
recycled to their competitors which motivates suppliers to 
be active buyers of TGC. But the fact that the obligation 
has a short time horizon and there is no technology band 
split creates demand risks that cancel to some extent the 
attractiveness of the forms of the first mentioned 
variables. As regards price risks these are very high 
because there are no price floors and the lifetime of 
certificates is very short compared to the obligation 
interval. Therefore overall the aggregated economic risks 
can be assessed as high. The profitability of projects can 
only be very low not only because price ceiling is low, 
but since there is no price floor and the lifetime of 
certificates is so short, obligees can afford to push TGC 
prices down to the limit of economic survival of 
generators. 
Risks: high
Projects’ profitability: low (Area IV)
Risks: high
Profitability: moderate / good (Area II)
- internal finance schemes overwhelmingly
- mostly very large firms and self-generators
- predominantly small size projects
- lowest-cost mature technology models
- internal finance schemes likely to dominate
- large developers dominate market
- small / medium size projects
- adoption of incrementally innovative models possible
Risks: low / moderate.
Profitability: low (Area III)
Risks: low / moderate.
Profitability: moderate / good (Area I)
- internal finance schemes likely to dominate
- diversity in types of developers possible
- larger-size projects likely to dominate
- low-cost mature technology models
- project finance may be largely used, maybe institutional finance too
- large diversity in types of developers
- all size projects can be expected
- frequent adoption of innovative technology models
 
Figure 1. The representation of four selected TGC configurations as risk-profitability investment 
frameworks for non-obligee investors and hypotheses regarding diffusion results and processes. 
 
Aggregated economic risks
         Configuration 4            Configuration 2
high most likely not effective;     good chances for effectiveness
unsustainable diffusion              possible sustainable diffusion
Area IV                 Area II
         Configuration 3                    Configuration 1
medium        
               weak chances for effectiveness effective in target reach;
        
                and for sustainable diffusion     sustainable diffusion processes
low
Area III                  Area I
                     low                             moderate / high           Projects’ profitability
 
 
Table 3. Probabilistic correlations between risk-profitability investment contexts 
and diffusion patterns of supported technologies. 
 
 
3.3 Possible consequences of the four TGC configuration 
for diffusion patterns and processes of wind technology 
As mentioned, the analytical framework proposed in this 
paper draws on main findings of the author in a previous 
research endeavor [1]. Part of the theoretical expectations 
in that project regarded the forms of diffusion patterns of 
new renewable technologies in different risk-profitability 
contexts and were largely empirically backed-up2. They 
are reproduced in Table 3, which relates to Figure 1. 
Considering these findings acceptable, this means that 
under Configuration 1 it would be possible to see wind 
plants built with project finance schemes quite often. 
There are chances for large diversity in the types of 
project developers, and all sizes of wind plants could be 
seen, according to the financial potential of each 
developer. These diffusion patterns are most likely to 
lead to substantial wind capacity increase. Many equity 
investors will be attracted by the low risks and good 
profitability prospects, and the availability of project 
finance can help to reflect investment interest more 
closely in wind capacity commissioned. Besides, it is 
possible that some developers will be willing to invest in 
more innovative technology models. Investment interest 
is able to stimulate industrial dynamics bringing more 
manufacturing and service companies in the country. The 
nationally located wind industry is better able to 
consolidate and continue progress in technical and cost 
performances. In addition, the fact that this configuration 
is attractive also for small developers, especially if local 
firms, associations and individuals in resource rich sites 
and also willing and able to invest, this can contribute to 
the improvement of social acceptability of wind projects. 
Consequently, it could be argued that TGC-based quota 
designs resulting in risk-profitability investment contexts 
similar to Configuration 1 have good chances to be 
effective in achieving their target and create investment 
frameworks that can support the continuity of market 
diffusion processes on a longer-term span.  
A TGC system with risk-profitability characteristics 
similar to those of Configuration 2 (Figure 1) has lower 
but still good chances to be effective in reaching its target 
and setting in motion continuous diffusion processes. 
Large developers will dominate among the new-comer- 
generators. But due to the high economic risks they will 
be likely to use internal financial resources or corporate 
finance to invest and they will probably prefer 
small/medium size wind projects. However when 
obligees have the right to own wind plants, such as in 
Configuration 2, project finance will be easily available 
for them so as they can comply with their obligations, 
and project sizes can be as high as to respond to the quota 
obligation. Because the system places high price floors 
and ceilings, some developers may also choose newer 
wind turbine models, creating some demand for 
innovation in wind technology. The industrial dynamics 
and prospects for technical and cost improvements are 
still good. But the problem under this approach is that 
small developers will hardly be seen and it is less likely 
that local opposition to wind plants would persist if there 
is no gain or feasible ownership involvement at local 
level.  
When a TGC system results in an investment context 
with risk-profitability contexts similar to Configuration 3 
(Figure 1), diffusion patterns will be likely to take the 
forms mentioned in Table 3. The expected diversity in 
the types of developers may be able to improve social 
acceptance of wind plants. But the scarce availability of 
project finance, due to low profitability levels, might lead 
to lower investment interest than in the above-discussed 
cases. Both national industrial dynamics and technical-
cost performance improvements lie under larger question 
marks. Previous research suggested [1] that, in this 
context, the continuity of market diffusion processes 
depends on several country-specific circumstances: 
- the national availability of high-quality wind 
resources, 
- a tradition of entrepreneurship among small 
developers who are more likely to accept lower 
levels of project profitability;  
- the cultural business of large developers and 
readiness to invest for lower levels of profitability, 
- whether the financing community is not very 
stringent in its profitability requirements for project 
finance, and on  
- whether the financing community is open towards 
financing small developers.  
Target achievement and sustainability of market diffusion 
processes are in Area III strongly dependent on whether 
obligees have the right to own renewable capacity. 
The most un-favorable are TGC systems that result in 
high economic risks and low levels of profitability, such 
as for Configuration 4. Such systems are less likely to 
lead to meaningful capacity increase. Investments will be 
mainly done by some large companies with specific 
strategic reasons to invest or self-generators who could 
sell the TGC. The continuity of market diffusion 
processes is strongly linked in this case to the financial 
strength of the few interested developers. 
 
 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
The paper has shown that very different configurations of 
TGC can be more easily analysed and compared by 
translating the multitude of new variables in two more 
traditional variables: aggregated economic risks and 
likely ranges of profitability. The patterns through which 
wind technology is diffused, i.e. types of developers and 
of financing schemes, project sizes and technological 
designs, are strongly influenced by the risk-profitability 
context. Understanding which forms these patterns are 
likely to take under a certain TGC configuration can help 
one derive expectations regarding the potential for 
capacity increase, and therefore system’ effectiveness, 
the likelihood of progress in technical and cost 
performances, the intensity of industrial dynamics and 
the social acceptability of wind projects by means of 
ownership involvement. The paper has suggested that not 
any legal quota TGC system is effective in target 
achievement and able to create an investment framework 
that supports the continuity of market diffusion 
processes. This depends on how the risks embedded in 
the TGC system combine with the profitability it enables. 
When the financial support through the TGC system is 
small, the diffusion of wind technology depends on the 
national business culture and endowment with high 
quality wind resource. 
The TGC systems aim to reduce the costs of generating 
renewable electricity. This is a very legitimate goal, but if 
policy design is squeezing also profit opportunities, this 
would drive away may groups of potential developers. 
Theoretically at least, it would be possible to design TGC 
quota obligations that could be very stimulative for wind 
technology diffusion. Some key variables for this would 
be: 
- high price floors for green certificates, because 
developers already have to face lowering pool prices 
and increasing pool price risks (in many countries); 
- distribution of financial penalties among generators 
with unsold green certificates, and not among 
compliant obligees like in the UK, because there are 
other ways to reduce demand risks; 
- life-time of certificates should be longer than the 
time interval between two deadlines for compliance 
proof by obligees. 
Quota obligations based on TGC do not represent one 
type of support system inherently dangerous for 
renewables diffusion. They represent a new approach, 
with a potential large diversity of consequences, which 
can be indeed misused or made to work against 
renewables, to "prove" that renewables would never 
mature, when political commitment is weak or distracted 
by other interest. 
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